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public assistance.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G01, G21, N20  














*  Corresponding  author,  Indiana  University,  Kelley  School  of  Business,  Bloomington,  Indiana  (USA), 
Università  Politecnica  delle  Marche  and  MoFiR,  Ancona  (Italy),  email:  fratiann@indiana.edu.  **  Università 
Politecnica delle Marche and MoFiR, Ancona (Italy), email: f.marchionne@univpm.it.  2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The financial earthquake of the subprime crisis, starting in 2007 and further developing in the 
subsequent two years, generated a tsunami of public interventions into banking systems. In this paper, 
we examine government policies aimed at rescuing banks from the effects of this crisis. To delimit 
the scope of the analysis, we concentrate on the fiscal side of interventions and ignore, by design, the 
monetary policy reaction to the crisis (in essence, we ignore inflation as a possible exit strategy).  
The subprime crisis fits many of the characteristics of the credit-boom-and-bust-cycle 
hypothesis, discussed, among others, by Mitchell (1913), Fisher (1933), Minsky (1977) and 
Kindleberger (1978); for a review, see Fratianni (2008). Other characteristics, instead, are unique to 
this crisis, such as the transfer of assets from the balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation 
of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to properly assess the risk of such 
assets, and the application of fair value accounting. The “originate-to-distribute” bank model lowered 
the incentive of the originator to screen debtors whose loans were to be placed off balance sheet. 
While reputational considerations would suggest that the originator might not want to compromise its 
standards, the fact that regulators and accounting standards required little disclosure about 
unconsolidated off-balance sheet entities made these entities opaque to investors and lowered the cost 
of reputational loss to the sponsoring institution. To complicate matters, the ratings agencies were not 
up to the task of properly evaluating the new complex products (Calomiris 2007). In fact, there is 
evidence that credit standards deteriorated in the United States during the 2001-2007 credit boom, 
especially in the subprime mortgage market (Demyanyk and van Hembert 2009; Dell’Ariccia et al. 
2008). Another problem with the “originate-to-distribute” model stems from the contingency that the 
off-balance sheet entities could be reabsorbed by the sponsoring institution to either cover large 
trading losses or prevent a downgrade of the sponsored institution’s credit risk (IMF 2008a, Box 2.6). 
At that point, there would be a reversal of the intended benefits of the “originate-to-distribute” model: 3 
 
risk would return home and regulatory capital would rise. The investor, having finally gained 
transparency in the transaction, would judge correctly that the sponsoring bank was overleveraged 
and would demand a higher return on capital; this, in turn, would translate into a spot drop of the 
share price of the consolidated bank. 
Governments have intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the crisis. We 
examine the effectiveness of these interventions by measuring the markets’ reaction to intervention 
announcements. To do so, we create an original dataset of public interventions that distinguishes 
announcements directed at the banking system as a whole (general announcements) from those 
directed at specific banks (specific announcements). With this dataset, we apply event-study 
methodology to estimate the value of government interventions to support banks and their 
shareholders. The maintained hypothesis is that the announcement of a rescue plan is credible if it 
affects rates of return of the targeted banks. We test for these effects by computing cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) of the participating banks around a window that includes announcement 
dates. We perform four separate tests on our sample of large banks. One test estimates, with panel 
data, the overall impact on banks’ equity value of the two types of government rescue 
announcements; a second estimates cross-area spillover effects of general announcements; a third 
estimates cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements using US banks; and a fourth 
considers the impact of multiple specific announcements. 
Our findings show that general and specific announcements are priced by the markets as CAR 
over the selected window periods. General announcements tend to be associated with positive CAR  
and specific announcements with negative ones. Foreign general announcements exert cross-area 
spillovers, but are perceived by home-country banks as boosting the competitive advantage of foreign 
banks. Specific announcements exert spillovers on other banks. Our results are also sensitive to the 
information environment. Specific announcements tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return 4 
 
before the crisis erupts, when announcements are few and markets have relative confidence in the 
“normal” information flow. The opposite takes place when the crisis explodes, announcements are 
the order of the day and markets mistrust the information flow. These results appear consistent with 
the observed reluctance of individual institutions to seek public assistance. Bank size is priced 
positively by the markets, but there is no clear evidence of too-big-to-fail policy. Specific 
announcements exacerbate moral hazard of subsided banks and make the banking system more 
fragile to negative shocks and less sensitive to further injections of public funds.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market reaction to the crisis and 
shows that Lehman Brothers’ failure was a critical event. Section 3 reviews event-study methodology 
with a focus on the event-parameter application within a regression framework. Section 4 describes 
our testable models. Section 5 reviews the long list of government announcements to rescue banks 
and discusses our dataset. We show that governments have employed a mixture of capital injections 
and bank asset and debt guarantees, and that opaque but politically attractive guarantees have been 
dominant. Section 6 employs event-study methodology to estimate the impact of government 
interventions on banks and their shareholders. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.  
 
1.  MARKETS’ REACTION TO LIQUIDITY RUSH AND RISK REPRICING  
The first effect of the crisis on the market was a rush for liquidity due to risk repricing of assets. The 
liquidity crisis exploded in the interbank market in August of 2007. Figure 1 plots TED spreads –the 
difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month Treasury bill– during the entire 
subprime crisis for three areas of the world: the United States, Europe and the Pacific region. Under 5 
 
ordinary times, this spread is contained within 20 to 30 basis points.
1 From September 15 (the day 
when Lehman declared bankruptcy) to October 14, 2008, the US TED spread averaged over 300 basis 
points; on October 10, 2008, the Friday that ended a historic week of panic selling in the equity 
markets, it reached an all-time peak of 464 basis points. A similar story holds for the TED-equivalent 
spreads of the large European countries and Hong Kong. Japan, on the other hand, stands out as a 
country of moderate risk. On March 9, 2009, the bottom of stock market value, the TED spread had 
regained the pre-crisis level in the United States, United Kingdom and Hong Kong, but not in Europe 
where the risk remained high for additional three months.  
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
   The markets were gripped by fears of credit and liquidity risks, two risks distinguishable in 
theory, but not in practice (IMF 2008b, pp. 78-81). The massive injections of monetary base by central 
banks were ineffective in containing the spreads in the interbank market because market participants 
were worried about large credit risks and adverse selection, and could not separate liquidity from credit 
risk concerns. Spreads relative to yields on government bonds shot up across all maturities (IMF 
2008b, pp. 172-3).
2 The switch in the public’s degree of risk aversion was justified by the mounting 
difficulty of gathering reliable information on opaque clients in times of distress. Confronted with 
more uncertainty in assessing the true credit status of relatively opaque borrowers, creditors had no 
better method than applying higher interest rates to entire classes of borrowers. The fog shrouding 
banks’ balance sheets and the financial markets was reinforced by opaque accounting practices 
(Fratianni and Marchionne 2009).
3  
                                                   
1 At the peak of the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the South-East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the TED spread rose to 
approximately  60  basis  points.  In  the  Gulf  War  and  the  crisis  of  Long  Term  Capital  Management,  it  peaked  at 
approximately 120 basis points. 
2 See Mishkin (1991) for historical evidence from the 19
th and 20
th century US panics. 
3 To illustrate, according to reported accounting data, the US banking system did not appear severely undercapitalized: at 
the end of 2008, the ratio of Tier 1 or core capital to risk-weighted assets was 17.4 percent for small banks, 12.3 percent for 
intermediate banks, and 9.4 percent for large banks. These ratios are way above the benchmark of 4 percent. Yet, it was 6 
 
  The shrinking of balance sheets and the re-pricing of risk across a variety of assets triggered a 
process of deleveraging, as predicted by the credit-boom-and-bust hypothesis. From the second half of 
2007 through September 2008, deleveraging of global banks was met with $430 billion of fresh capital 
(IMF 2008b, p. 22). Then, with recapitalization becoming increasingly difficult,  deleverage was 
achieved by selling assets in illiquid markets. Thus, without significant profits to retire debt or fresh 
capital to finance it, the deleveraging process necessarily implied distress sales and falling asset values 
(Adrian and Shin 2008, Figure 2.5). Fair value accounting aggravated the problem through its pro-
cyclical bias. Lower accounting asset prices impacted negatively on regulatory capital and may have 
pushed bankers to engage in liquidation sales that further depressed asset prices.  
Stock market data show the extent of the financial maelstrom. We collect equity prices for a 
sample of banks from three areas of the world: the United States, Western Europe, and the Pacific 
region. The actual list, shown in the Table A1 of the Appendix, includes 45 US banks, 51 banks from 
15 different Western European countries, and 26 banks from three different Pacific region countries; 
more on our data below.
4 The listed banks tend to be large and thus capable of engaging in complex 
structured finance. Table 1 provides average rates of return, both in local currency and in US dollars, at 
the country level for three periods: the first phase of the crisis from the starting pre-crisis date of July 
31, 2007 to September 15, 2008, an expanded phase of the crisis from the same starting date to March 
9, 2009, and the complete sample period from the same starting date to our last observation of 
December 31, 2009. September 15, 2008 is a significant date because it is the day when Lehman 
Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, an event widely believed to be a watershed in the 
crisis; March 9, 2009 was selected because is the date when the market finally bottomed out.
  
                                                                                                                                                                              
widely acknowledged that banks were severely undercapitalized. Undercapitalization has been the biggest stumbling block 
to the resolution of the financial crisis. 
4 Only the largest listed banks are included. For Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland, we have one bank each.  7 
 
 [Insert Table 1, here] 
  Over the extended period from July 31, 2007 to March 9, 2009, the crisis destroyed $3.34 
trillion of market values in our bank sample. European banks were hit the hardest with a 79.94 
percent decline, the Pacific banks were hit the mildest with a 52.13 percent decline, and US banks 
fared in the middle with a 76.42 percent decline. The decline, furthermore, was at least twice as large 
after September 15, 2009 than in the first phase of the crisis. Table 1 shows rates of return both in 
local currency and in US dollar. Dollar returns are the sum of local-currency returns, the rate of dollar 
depreciation (or appreciation if negative) and the interaction between these two terms. The US dollar 
depreciated relative to most currencies in the pre-Lehman period, appreciated in the first part of the 
post-Lehman period and then depreciated again after May of 2009.  Consider bank stocks in the euro 
area. In the pre-Lehman period, rates of return averaged -37 percent, over a range spanning from -32 
percent for Greece to -61 percent for Ireland. Banks from France, Germany, Ireland, and Portugal  
fared worse than banks from Greece, Italy, Spain, and Netherlands. From July 31, 2007 to March 9, 
2009, the euro-area average rate of return was an astounding -74 percent, ranging from -64 percent 
for Spain to -98 percent for Ireland. Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, German and Irish banks did much 
worse than French and Southern European banks. For most countries, but not for the United 
Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and Australia, the differences between local-currency returns and US 
dollar returns were of a small order of magnitude.  
  At first, governments reacted to the crisis with disjointed and ad-hoc interventions, which were 
accompanied by sharp declines in equity prices. For example, the US government supported some 
institutions (Bear Stearns being acquired by JPMorgan Chase), but not others (Lehman Brothers). The 
failure of Lehman on September 15, 2008 was a watershed and prompted policymakers in the next two 
months to implement programs addressing systemic problems, such as the $700 billion Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) in the United States and the £500 billion banking recapitalization program in 8 
 
the United Kingdom. The initial objective of purchasing sub-standard illiquid assets ran into 
difficulties because, without a market, governments were likely to either overvalue “toxic” assets, thus 
penalizing taxpayers, or undervaluing them, thus penalizing potential sellers. Governments then 
adjusted their policy by either recapitalizing financially distressed banks (e.g., in the United States) or 
nationalizing them (e.g., in the United Kingdom). In December 2008 and January 2009, governments 
tried to douse the fire of the crisis by targeting specific large banks (e.g., Commerzbank and 
Citigroup); they were unsuccessful. In February and March 2009, additional general measures were 
taken, this time with a focus on relieving banks of bad assets. At the same time, many indebted US 
banks began repaying the US government, while in Europe the number of banks that had signaled their 
intention for government assistance declined (e.g., Intesa Sanpaolo and Unicredit in Italy). 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
The rescue of several large financial institutions in the United States and in Europe was sparked by the 
migration of liquidity risk from banks to other financial institutions and followed the rapidly expanding 
role of government as a market maker of last resort to support not only big banking, but also big 
finance. We employ event-study methodology to estimate markets’ reaction to the announcements of 
government interventions.  
  Event-study methodology goes back to the 1930s (Dolley 1933), but became ubiquitous in 
capital markets research after important contributions by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. 
(1969).
5 The spreading popularity of this technique, however, was accompanied by modifications of 
the original setup that implied violations of the underlying statistical assumptions (MacKinlay 1997). 
Corrections and practical adjustments to these practices surfaced in the second half of 1970s; for a 
                                                   
5 Kothari and Warner (2006) report that, over the period 1974-2000, five top finance journals published 565 articles using 
event-study methodology. 9 
 
review, see Serra (2002) and Corrado (2009). There is now agreement that the general setup of this 
methodology consists of three stages: the identification of an event of interest and its timing; the 
specification of a valuation model; and an analysis and computation of CAR (cumulative abnormal 
returns) around the event date (De Jong 2007, p. 2). The procedure can be implemented in two 
alternative ways (Binder 1998). The first is a two-step approach, in which a valuation model is first 
estimated over a control (pre-event) estimation period and then CAR is computed as cumulative 
residuals of the valuation model over a short event window; for an example, see O’Hara and Shaw 
(1990). The second is an event-parameter approach, in which the valuation model is estimated over the 
combined estimation and event periods, and includes dummy variables defined (to be equal to one) 
over a relevant event window; for an example, see Meulbroek (1992). 
The two approaches are unbiased and equivalent under the assumption of serially independent 
and normally distributed returns and non-overlapping event windows (Corrado 2009). Conversely, 
problems arise in the presence of overlapping windows, multiple events, aggregation of abnormal 
returns across firms, cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation, event-induced volatility and event-
induced returns (De Jong 2007). A number of these statistical problems can be overcome with the 
event-parameter regression framework (Binder 1998). In our case, general announcements are clearly 
overlapping because they influence all banks in a country; furthermore, if different countries were to 
coordinate their policies overlapping would be exacerbated. Also, public interventions become  
multiple events when the same bank receives subsidies repeatedly during the crisis. In the presence of 
overlapping multiple events, Binder (1998) suggests the use of event-parameter methodology because 
it simplifies the estimation and is more flexible in hypothesis testing. This methodology provides also a 
natural solution to aggregation problems across banks. Other considerations as well support the choice 
of the event-parameter framework: with relatively frequent events, as it is true in our case, information 
on multiple events is lost or distorted by the two-step approach because the estimation window is either 10 
 
too short or affected by previous announcements. The event-parameter methodology is relatively more 
efficient because abnormal returns are estimated in one step.
6  
 
3.  TESTABLE MODELS 
We propose four separate tests using the event-parameter methodology. The first aims at uncovering 
the overall impact on banks’ equity value of general and specific announcements; the second at 
identifying the cross-area spillover effects of general announcements; the third at unveiling the cross-
bank spillover effects of specific announcements; and the last test focuses on multiple specific 
announcements. 
  In the first test, daily rates of returns on bank stock i of country j at time t, Rijt, are regressed 
on an intercept, capturing the risk-free rate of return and on the market rate of return, R
M
jt, and two 
dummy event variables. The first dummy variable, Gjt, is equal to one during the event time window, 
T, around a general announcement; otherwise it is zero. The second dummy variable, Sit, is equal to 
one in the time window T around a specific announcement. We also break down G and S by different 




jt ijt u S G R R + × + × + × + = d g b a ,      (1) 
where u denotes a well-behaved error term and G and S become dummy vectors when we disaggregate 
by intervention type.
7 Markets’ reactions to announcements are captured by γ and δ: returns within the 
time window T are predicted to be higher than returns in other periods; that is, the government-
                                                   
6    Furthermore  we  employ  robust  standard  errors  and  cluster  correction  to  reduce  problems  of  serial  correlation  and 
heteroskedasticity. 











jt ijt u S G S G R R + × + × + × + × + × + = d g d g b a     (1b) 
where CAP and GUA indicate, respectively, capital injection and asset and debt guarantees. 11 
 
intervention event generates CAR. Since the error of the regression must be zero on average, the null 
hypothesis is that CAR, within T, must also be zero. A rejection of the null hypothesis corroborates the 
presence of abnormal returns. In (1),  CAR is  the sum of the estimates of parameters γ and δ 
multiplied by T (Meulbroek 1992). 
  The second test uses bank data from each of the three areas, as in (2): 
3 , 2 , 1 , ,
3
1
, , , , , , = + × + × + × + + = ∑
=
× j u XAG S G R R j it
k
j tk j k j it j j t j
M
j t j it j j q d g b a .       (2) 
There are two differences with respect to equation (1). The first is that coefficients are now denoted 
with a subscript “j” to indicate that they are area specific. The second is that (2) adds three cross-area  
general announcement dummies, XAGk,j, where k is the area broadcasting G and j another area 
receiving the potential impact of G: for example, XAG3,1 captures the G effect of area 3 (say, Pacific) 
on area 1 (say, US). Cross effects can also occur among countries located in the same area (for 
example Australia impacting Japan). Such within-area cross effects are denoted by XAGj,j.
8  In (2), 
CAR is equal to the estimate of θk,j times T.  
  The third test focuses on cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements, S. The 
motivation for this experiment is that during a crisis markets are shrouded in a fog of ignorance about 
the true extent of banks’ difficulties. The news that one large bank will be receiving government 
support sends two separate signals. One signal is that if government saves a large bank, it is also likely 
to save another large bank (too-big-to-fail effect); the other signal is that government will have fewer 
resources to deploy for other large banks (resource crowding-out effect). The Lehman’s failure shook 
                                                   
8 Note that XAGj,j is not collinear with Gj because we use country data.  12 
 
the markets exactly because it was a glaring exception to the too-big-to-fail principle.
9 Given the 
limitations of our data, we restrict the test to US banks (k=1).  
  We perform the test in two alternative ways. In the first version, we group US banks in 
tertiles to estimate effects of cross-group specific announcements, XGSj,i. 






, , , , , , = + × + × + × + × + + = ∑ ∑
= =
× g u XGS XAG S G R R g it
z
g tz g z
k
g tk g k g it g g t g
M
g t g g g it l q d g b a (3a) 
where subscript j was dropped because all i banks are located in the same country and subscript g is 
added for tertiles. XGStz,g indicates cross-specific announcements of bank group z on group g, except 
for those of  bank i. Coefficient γg captures the effect of US  general announcements, δg the effect of  
specific announcements for the i
th bank, θk,g the effect of cross-general announcements from Europe 
and the Pacific area, and λz,g the effect of specific announcements from bank group z on the g
th group, 
except those of bank i. 
 
  In the second version, we test the too-big-too-fail policy among the largest US banks. The 
formulation of the test is given by equation (3b): 






, , , , , , = + × + × + × + × + + = ∑ ∑
¹ = =
× i u XBS XAG S G R R i t
i h h
i th i h
k
i tk i k i t i i t i
M
i t i t i i l q d g b a    (3b) 
where XBSh,i indicates the cross-specific announcement of bank h on bank i. Note that the own specific 
announcement S is equal to the cross-specific announcement XBS when i=h. Coefficients are the same 
of equation (3a), except for λh≠i that captures the effect of a specific announcement of the h
th bank (say, 
Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, American Express, and Morgan Stanley) on the 
i
th bank (say, Bank of America).  
  In the final test, we focus on the effects of multiple specific announcements. One reason why 
such announcements are repeated may stem from  the incomplete nature of the information available to 
                                                   
9 For evidence of the too-big-to-fail principle, see O’Hara and Shaw (1990). 13 
 
governments. Banks tend to hide their financial difficulties to avoid the cost of higher risk premium on 
own debt and equity. Furthermore, the granting of the subsidy can induce the targeted bank to either be 
more prudent or more opportunistic (moral hazard), depending on whether the government makes the 
subsidy conditional on tough requirements and strict monitoring or not. If requirements are perceived 




c it c c jt c
M




, , , d g b a ,      (4) 
where c is the number of specific announcements received by the i
th bank. We do not consider c>2 
because we have too few observations. Using c = 0 as a benchmark, negative α1 and α 2 and positive β1 
and β2 are consistent with an opportunistic behavior. Coefficients γ1 and γ2 capture the effect of 




4.  DATA 
Our dataset consists of daily rates of return on 122 large listed banks from 19 countries and national 
market indices from July 31, 2007 to December 31, 2009. The listed banks are shown in Table A1 of 
the Appendix; Bloomberg is the source of the data. We also collected announcement dates of 
government rescue plans over the same period. As mentioned, we classify two types of rescue-
announcement events: G, whereby the government declares its intention to protect the entire national 
banking system, and S aimed at saving specific banks; see Tables A2 and A3, respectively, in the 
Appendix. We used a variety of sources for the compilation of general and specific announcements: 
BNP Paribas (2009), DLA Piper (online), International Capital Market Association (online), 14 
 
Mediobanca (2009), Panetta et al. (2009), and websites of CNN Money and national Ministries of 
Finance or Treasuries.  
For the 19 countries represented in our sample, there are 51 general announcements over 33 
different dates, of which 30 are capital injections and 21 are asset and debt guarantees (Appendix, 
Table A2). There are 139 specific announcements over 88 different dates, of which 103 as capital 
injections and 36 as asset and debt guarantees (Appendix, Table A3). Specific announcements affect 
53 of the 122 banks and two thirds of the countries in our sample.
10 Pacific-area banks are the least 
affected by announcements. Finally, 33 banks in our sample have been the target of multiple 
announcements.  
From the date of Lehman’s failure to the end of 2009, governments have committed $8.6 
trillion of funds in general rescue packages, of which 37.6 percent as capital injections and 63.4 
percent as asset and debt guarantees; see Appendix, Table A2. The rescue plans of the United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany and Ireland were larger than those of Italy, Denmark, Greece, and 
Portugal. Clearly, differences in the committed amounts cannot be explained only by differences in 
national sizes of financial markets.  
Commitments to specific interventions, over the same period, amount to $2.4 trillion, of which 
39.9 percent as capital injections and 60.1 percent as asset and debt guarantees (Appendix, Table A3). 
The ranking of subsidy-receiving banks changes according to the type of intervention. Considering all 
subsidies, the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds TBS top the list, respectively with $529 and $408 
billion, followed by Citigroup and Hypo Real Estate with $330 billion each, Dexia with $228 billion 
and Bank of America with $144 billion.  
                                                   
10 These countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 15 
 
In sum, governments have used a mix of general and specific interventions, reflecting the 
opaqueness of information after Lehman’s failure. Asset and debt guaranties are politically attractive 
because governments do not have to argue the case with legislators. They also entail smaller current 
costs than the expected present-value contingent cost, suggesting that governments are prone to gamble 
for a possible resurrection of the banking system. This strategy was a defining characteristic of both 
the US Savings and Loans crisis of the Eighties and the long Japanese crisis of the Nineties, which was 
responsible for transforming “a relatively small cost into a staggeringly large one” (Glauber 2000, p. 
102).  
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics for the pre-Lehman and post-Lehman failure periods; 
for brevity, we shall refer to these two periods as PRE and POST, respectively. Bank returns Ri tend to 
be procyclical in both periods. The variability  of Ri (measured by its standard deviation) is higher than 
the variability of market returns, Rm, and rises from PRE to POST. Both individual (SIZEi) and overall 
(SIZEm) market capitalizations of banks decrease around 35 percent from PRE to POST, implying no 
material change in relative bank size (SIZEREL). The within serial variability of SIZEi falls from 45 to 
36 between the two periods, whereas the overall variability of SIZEo rises from 444 to 738, implying 
an increase in the between cross-sectional variability. The main message is that the financial crisis 
enlarged size differences among banks.  
[Insert Table 2, here] 
5.  FINDINGS 
The hypothesis underlying our analysis is that the announcement of a rescue plan is credible if it raises 
the survivability and rates of return of participating banks. Therefore, we can test the effects of rescue 
plans by computing CAR of participating banks around an announcement-date window. Estimates of 
alpha, the risk free rate, and beta, the market risk parameter, from the capital asset price model are 
estimated on daily returns for the PRE and POST periods. A general announcement is more complex 16 
 
than a specific announcement because it requires longer time for the market to process it; in addition, it 
is easier for the markets to obtain relevant information about general than specific announcements. For 
this reason, we apply different windows to the two types of announcements: a seven-day window for 
general announcements centered on the announcement date and spanning three working days before 
and after the announcement, and a five-day window for specific announcements centered on the 
announcement date and spanning two working days before and after the announcement. We exclude 
UK banks from the estimation because UK capital injections were in fact nationalizations that tend to 
be unfavorable to private shareholders and can distort market reactions.
11 Consequently, the number of 
banks in our sample is reduced to 116.  
 
5.1 Overall impact of  general and specific announcements on banks’ rates of return 
The first test estimates the overall impact of 49 general and 133 specific announcements on banks’ 
returns using the entire panel of 116 banks.
12 Results for the two periods are shown in Table 3: PRE 
has 33,189 observations and POST 38,745, of which 15,060 from the United States, 15,065 from 
Europe, and 8,620 from the Pacific area. We test equation (1) first by aggregating all announcements 
(ALL) and then using the two individual categories of capital injections (CAP) and asset and debt 
guarantees (GUA); see equation (1b). We recall that a general announcement G has a seven-day 
window and a specific announcement S a five-day window. We experimented with different window 
lengths: results tend to weaken as the window is enlarged, in particular for S. Obviously, the bulk of 
                                                   
11 For example, partial nationalization reduces the volume of traded shares that, in turn, affects stock price. Conversely, 
public ownership provides an explicit safety net. 
12 We drop announcements from  the United Kingdom (two general announcements and six specific announcements). 17 
 
the announcements occurs in POST. The panel is estimated with bank fixed effects, a specification that 
is not rejected by the Hausman (1978) test.
13  
  In addition to the variables indicated on the right-hand side of equation (1), we have added 
relative bank size measured as the US dollar capitalization value of bank i relative to capitalization of 
all banks (SIZEREL). This variable turns out to have positive and statistically significant effects in all 
the regressions. On average, 0.35 percentage points of returns depend on SIZEREL in PRE and over 
0.45 in POST. Relevant differences emerge among banks. Take Hypo Real Estate, Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena, and Bank of New York Mellon, respectively the first quartile, median, and third 
quartile in the distribution of market-value capitalization in PRE. SIZEREL impact on returns of Hypo 
Real Estate is nine times lower than on returns of Banca Monte dei Paschi and 25 times lower than on 
returns of Bank of New York Mellon.  
  The first key finding of Table 3 is that all announcements have a statistically significant and 
economically relevant impact on banks’ rates of return.
14 The PRE period has no general 
announcements G and relatively few specific announcements S, which produce a CAR of 8.8 
percentage points. In the POST period, G-induced CAR are almost 5 percentage points higher than 
normal returns while S-induced CAR are 1.7 percentage points lower than normal returns. The 
opposite signs of the G and S coefficients reflect differences in the way markets evaluate the two types 
of announcements. A general announcement is taken as a signal that government wants to protect the 
                                                   
13  The  Hausman  (1978)  specification  test  uses  the  statistic  ) ( ) ( ) (
1
RE FE RE FE RE FE Var N H b b b b b b - - ¢ - =
-   to 
compare fixed effects with random effects, where N = number of observations,  FE b  and  RE b  are respectively the vector 
of coefficients in the fixed and random effect model, and Var(.) indicates the variance-covariance operator; H has a chi-
squared distribution. In Table 3, except for the last column, the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients from the 
fixed  effect  model is  not  systematically  different  from the  coefficients of  the  random  effect  model  is  rejected  at  the 
significance level of 5%. In this case, that is under the alternative hypothesis, the random-effect model is inconsistent, 
where  the  fixed-effect  model  is.  In  the  last  column,  observations  decrease  and  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  at  the 
significance level of 10%.  
14 WALD tests of null announcement effects are rejected in all specifications at 5 percent level, except for first period 
(column 1) rejected at 10 percent level. 18 
 
banking systems. The banking industry, as a whole, receives support and shareholders gain 
“abnormally” high rates of return over the announcement window. A specific announcement, instead, 
generates a more problematic signal. During “normal” times, when markets face stable information 
flows and are able to price banks’ future net cash flows with relative efficiency, S is evaluated as a 
boost to shareholders’ return. On the other hand, in the fog of a financial crisis, when markets are 
extremely uncertain about the quality of the assets, a specific announcement  is taken as a revelation of 
partially unknown troubles. S-induced CAR, therefore, may turn out to be negative. On this point, it is 
worth recalling that particularly hectic activities took place in the first half of October 2008, when 
governments intervened on a big scale to stabilize their banking systems; see Figure 2. Over a three-
week period, policy makers first decided to guarantee or purchase assets (GUA), then to inject fresh 
capital into banks (CAP), and finally to guarantee bank debts (GUA). The speed with which new 
strategies were introduced underscores the state of confusion, if not outright panic, enshrouding 
government decisions. Capital markets were extremely opaque in the immediate wake of Lehman’s 
failure. 
  Differences in the information environment appear to be corroborated by CAR patterns in the 
two periods: specific announcements have a positive impact on Ri in PRE, when announcements were 
few and markets had relative confidence in the “normal” information flow (column 1); but negative in 
the turbulent POST when announcements were the order of the day and markets mistrusted the 
information flow (column 2). These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of 
individual institutions to ask for public assistance. The fear of being identified as a “bad apple” was 
also the reason why some banks were reticent to seek emergency lending from central banks.  
  In column 3, the base model is expanded with interactive terms between market returns and 
the two announcement dummies, so as to capture abnormal betas. We find a negative (positive) 
abnormal market risk for general (specific) announcements, a pattern that corroborates the earlier result 19 
 
that general announcements provide a safety net to banking system whereas specific announcements 
appear to identify “bad apple” banks. We also check, in column 4, for potential too-big-too-fail effect 
by adding interactive terms between SIZEREL and announcement dummies; we find no evidence of 
that. 
  The second key finding of Table 3 is that markets have had difficulties in sorting out the 
relative efficacy of different types of announcements. Column 5 reports the estimate of the base model 
and columns 6 through 9 the estimates of the expanded model. Both G
CAP and G
GUA exert a positive 
impact on Ri. On the other hand, the negative impact of S on Ri is driven wholly by S
CAP. Area 
regressions confirm this pattern. In column 6, abnormal betas are estimated by intervention types: 
general announcements of asset and debt guarantees lower beta, whereas general announcements of 
capital injections and the two types of specific announcements raise beta. Columns 7 through 9 
underscore differences of abnormal market risk in the three areas. In particular, the US market stands 
out as somewhat different with respect to other areas.  
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 2, here] 
  A point of interest is to check the stability of the coefficient estimates over the most turbulent 
part of the crisis. To this end, we run rolling regressions of the base model recursively, starting with an 
initial estimation window spanning from July 31, 2007 to July 31, 2008 and then expanding it 




The impact of market risk rises sharply immediately after Lehman’s failure, then declines rapidly in 
the latter part of 2008, and finally rises steadily until June 2009. As to relative bank size, its effect on 
bank returns doubles after Lehman’s failure and stays high until the bottom of the markets, after which 
it falls to around one half of its pre-Lehman value. These patterns confirm that Lehman’s failure was a 
watershed in the crisis and that ensuing turbulence lasted approximately six months. Both general and 
specific announcements had positive effects on bank returns soon after Lehman’s demise, but as time 20 
 
progresses the effect of specific announcements switches in sign while the effect of general 
announcements remains positive.  
[Insert Figure 3, here]  
5.2 Cross-area spillover effects of general announcements  
Table 4 presents results of possible cross-area general announcement effects; cf. equation (2). A bank 
in a given country may respond not only to its country’s G and its own S, but also to G  affecting other 
banks abroad. To explore this issue, our 116 banks were divided into the three geographical areas of 
Europe, the Pacific, and the United States.
15 In the base model (left panel), four of the eight cross-area 
spillovers are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level.
16 Two different patterns emerge: 
the cross effect of the Pacific area on the United States is negative, but the cross effect of one Pacific 
country on another Pacific country is positive; the cross effect of the United States on Europe is 
positive, but the cross effect of one European country on another European country is negative. A 
positive cross effect is what one would expect in an interconnected world. On the other hand, a 
negative cross effect is consistent with a view that foreign rescue plans give a competitive advantage to 
foreign banks. It is also worth noting that the impact of the own G in the United States is at least twice 
as large as that in Europe and the Pacific area, reflecting the more aggressive and extensive nature of 
US intervention plans.    
  The results of the expanded model (right panel), in addition to confirming the results of the 
base model, show that the own G either reduces or leaves unchanged market risk in Europe and the 
Pacific area, but raises it in the United States. This indicates that bank interconnectedness runs from 
Western Europe and the Pacific area to the United States, but not vice versa. The noted US 
                                                   
15  We  cannot  determine  cross-country  spillovers  because  of  the  collinearity  of  many  general  announcements  across 
countries. 
16 Note that some other coefficients are only marginally insignificant.  21 
 
distinctiveness may well reflect US financial leadership in the world, including the special role of the 
US dollar in the international monetary system.  
 [Insert Table  4, here] 
5.3 Cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements 
Next, we test the cross-bank spillover effects induced by specific announcements. Given the 
limitations of our data and the particular role of the US financial market, we restrict the test to the 45 
US banks in our sample, which are divided in tertiles based on their PRE market capitalization. Also, 
the data do not permit the use of interactive terms for cross-area and cross-group spillovers. Table 5 
shows the estimates of equation (3a). Cross-group effects are negative, suggesting a resource 
crowding-out phenomenon and the absence of a too-big-to-fail policy: when the government saves a 
bank, the market fears that the government will curtail subsidies to other banks.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We probe further into the too-big-to-fail issue by focusing on the largest banks; see Table 6. We select 
the top seven US banks by market capitalization as of June 30, 2008: Bank of America, JPMorgan, 
Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and American Express, which account for 
more than 60 percent of US bank market capitalization, 100 percent of asset and debt guarantees, and 
90 percent of capital injections.
17 The estimation is performed with OLS and robust standard errors. 
SIZEREL is no longer necessary without the cross-sectional dimension and it is eliminated.  
Recall that while a specific announcement may signal unexpected financial difficulties of the 
targeted institution and inter-bank competition for subsidies, it may also signal the intention of 
government to save another bank at least as big as the one it just saved. The pattern of cross-bank 
                                                   
17 Bank of America and JP Morgan, had market capitalization of $147 and $140 billion, respectively; Citigroup and Wells 
Fargo were approximately two-thirds of their size, Goldman Sachs half of their size, and Morgan Stanley and American 
Express less than one third of their size. This ranking holds for different dates of market valuations ad is consistent with a 
ranking based on employment.  22 
 
spillovers suggests both resource crowding-out and too-big-to-fail effects are present. The inference 
about the former emerges from negative and statistically significant coefficients in the upper triangle of 
the XBS matrix of Table 6: Bank of America’s announcements penalize the smaller Citigroup and 
Wells Fargo; similarly, Morgan Stanley’s announcements penalize the smaller American Express. 
Consistent with this pattern is the boost that American Express and Wells Fargo’s announcements give 
to larger Bank of America, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley, and Morgan Stanley’s announcements give 
to larger Citigroup. However, there are also deviations to this pattern, such as the negative cross-effect 
of Goldman Sachs‘s announcements on larger Citigroup and Wells Fargo. In sum, our findings are 
consistent with a mix of resource crowding-out and too-big-to-fail policy, albeit limited to the largest 
US banks. We leave open the possibility that too-big-to-fail policy may operate not only on size, but 
also on the degree of the targeted bank’s interconnectedness with other financial institutions.  
 [Insert Table 6, here] 
5.4 Multiple specific announcements  
Our last test relates to impact on bank returns of multiple specific announcements (CUM). Table 7 
reports the estimation of equation (4) after eliminating the dummy S because it is already included in  
CUM. We report on the selection of bank fixed vs. random effect models using the Hausman test. 
There are two sections in the table: one on the left relates to banks with at least one single specific 
announcement (CUM1 dummy variable) and the other on the right relates to banks with multiple 
specific announcements broken down by number of interventions (CUM1 and CUM2 dummy 
variables).
18 Concerning the former, three important findings emerge. The first is that beta rises when a 
bank receives a subsidy, suggesting a higher degree of moral hazard or a more fragile banking system. 
The second is that the benefit of a general announcement declines for banks targeted by a specific 
                                                   
18 CUM1 is equal to one 1 when bank i receives only one specific announcement and zero otherwise, whereas CUM2 is 
equal to one when bank i receives at least two specific announcements and zero otherwise. 23 
 
announcement, whose CAR  falls by 7.5 percentage points in the United States and 7.2 points in 
Europe. Furthermore, the interaction of G with CUM1 fails to reduce market risk of targeted banks. 
The third is that bank size becomes more important for multi-intervention banks in smaller European 
markets than in the larger US market. This could be interpreted as markets anticipating different 
reactions by authorities to bank size: too-big-to-fail policy may be more relevant for small than large 
countries because banks from small countries need to be larger in relation to domestic market size than 
banks from big countries to compete in global markets. The right panel of  Table 7 extends the model 
to distinguish between the effects of single-S (CUM1) and  multi-S banks (CUM2). The key finding 
here is that US multi-S banks face a higher market risk, whereas their European counterparts are 
penalized by negative G-induced CAR.
19 On the other hand, abnormal betas increase with the number 
of public interventions in the United Staates, but not in Europe.  
In sum, the findings of Table 7 suggest that the soft budget constraint implied by government 
subsidies  reduces the efficacy of repeated rescue announcements and induces a more opportunistic 
behavior in targeted banks. Differences between areas affect marginally this result. The diminishing 
benefits from government interventions have the policy implication that subsidies are only an urgent 
and temporary crisis measures and should be quickly replaced by structural reforms. 
[Insert Table 7, here] 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The great financial crisis of 2007-2009 had its roots in a credit boom that manifested itself in an 
extremely indebted US economy. Subprime defaults spread the fire in a financial system that had 
become fragile as a result of several factors unique to this crisis. Banks’ undercapitalization explains 
the persistence of the crisis and why governments have injected vast sums of public funds into banks.  
                                                   
19 CAR value is -27 percentage points; see column 6 of Table 7. 24 
 
  Our paper focuses on the specific question of whether general and specific rescue 
announcements were priced by the markets as cumulative abnormal returns over selected event 
windows. General announcements tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns (and lower 
market risk) and specific announcements with negative abnormal returns (and higher market risk); 
foreign general announcements exert cross-area spillovers, but are perceived by the home-country 
banks as subsidies boosting the competitive advantage of foreign banks; specific announcements exert 
a resource crowding-out effect on other banks; and multiple specific announcements increase the 
degree of moral hazard of subsidized banks. Our results are also sensitive to the information 
environment. Specific announcements tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return in the pre-
Lehman failure period, when announcements were few and markets trusted the “normal” information 
flow. The opposite occurred in the turbulent phase of the crisis when announcements were frequent 
and markets mistrusted the information flow. These results appear consistent with the observed 
reluctance of individual institutions to request public assistance. The fear of being identified as a “bad 
apple” was also the reason why some banks were reticent to apply at central banks for emergency 
lending. 
Three other generalizations emerge from our evidence. The first is that market reaction to 
rescue announcements is not uniform across areas. In particular, capital injections in the United States, 
the country where the crisis originated and the world’s financial leader, exert effects on bank returns 
that are different from those in other countries. The second is that markets appear to have valued 
timely and big actions without much regard to refinements as to the type of actions undertaken. The 
different long-run consequences of different types of interventions were ignored. As it is true in a war, 
participants in a financial crisis want to survive: planning horizons are shortened and considerations 
that are taken seriously under normal circumstances are instead relegated in the background. This 
pattern is consistent with the lessons from the last Nordic and Japanese banking crises: timely and big 25 
 
public interventions solved successfully the crisis in Sweden, whereas untimely and small government 
measures led to the lost Japanese decade. It is also consistent with the diminishing benefits from 
government interventions that reinforce markets’ perceptions that subsidies are urgent and temporary 
anti-crisis measures and should be quickly replaced by structural reforms. The third is that, given that 
different announcements produce similar effects, governments might have had incentives to gamble for 
opaque and “low-cost” guarantees of bank assets and debts rather than undertake more transparent and 
costly alternatives.   
Government rescue plans are likely to lead to a consolidation of the banking system. This, in 
turn, raises the probability of invoking the too-big-to-fail policy. We find that bank size matters even if 
there is not a clear evidence for the too-big-to-fail policy. In one test dealing with cross-bank spillovers 
using the largest US banks, our findings are consistent with a mix of resource crowding-out and too-
big-to-fail policy. Clues about the latter also emerge from multiple-event regressions by area. The 
resolution of this issue remains unsettled in part because the too-big-to-fail policy may operate not 
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Figure 1: TED spread and TED-equivalent spreads, various countries.  
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NOTES: TED spread is the difference between the three-month dollar LIBOR and the three-month T-bill interest rate 
(US); TED-equivalent spreads are those of the United Kingdom (UK), Honk-Kong (HK), Japan (JP), Germany (DE), 




Figure  2:  Cumulative  value  of  general  announcements  in  US$  billion,  September  28,  2008- 
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Figure 3: Recursive rolling coefficients, estimation window from July 31, 2007 to July 31, 2008.  
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Table 1: Rates of returns in local currency and in dollars of a sample of US, European and 
Pacific region banks, in percent, July 31, 2007- December 31, 2009. 
Area  Country  31/07/2007 15/09/2008  31/07/2007 09/03/2009  31/07/2007 31/12/2009 
      LCU  EXC  USD  LCU  EXC  USD  LCU  EXC  USD 
Europe  AT  -37.50  3.38  -35.38  -86.11  -7.84  -87.20  -60.89  4.53  -59.12 
   BE  -39.02  3.38  -36.96  -93.43  -7.84  -93.95  -70.28  4.53  -68.94 
   DE  -46.53  3.38  -44.72  -91.83  -7.84  -92.47  -77.40  4.53  -76.38 
   EI  -60.99  3.38  -59.67  -98.13  -7.84  -98.28  -93.77  4.53  -93.48 
   ES  -36.89  3.38  -34.75  -64.25  -7.84  -67.05  -38.00  4.53  -35.19 
   FR  -43.49  3.38  -41.58  -79.75  -7.84  -81.34  -47.36  4.53  -44.98 
   GR  -31.57  3.38  -29.26  -71.15  -7.84  -73.41  -52.38  4.53  -50.23 
   IT  -33.13  3.38  -30.87  -72.84  -7.84  -74.97  -54.14  4.53  -52.07 
   NL  -37.08  3.38  -34.95  -90.53  -7.84  -91.27  -72.46  4.53  -71.21 
   PT  -59.21  3.38  -57.83  -76.57  -7.84  -78.40  -63.65  4.53  -62.00 
   CH  14.07  7.38  22.49  15.35  3.32  19.18  17.56  16.05  36.43 
   DK  -41.00  3.20  -39.11  -80.81  -7.92  -82.33  -50.20  4.50  -47.96 
   NO  -30.50  0.46  -30.17  -72.32  -17.77  -77.24  -14.95  0.29  -14.70 
   SE  -39.05  -0.60  -39.42  -72.78  -26.26  -79.93  -34.96  -6.11  -38.93 
   UK  -28.75  -12.21  -37.45  -68.62  -32.44  -78.80  -28.31  -20.61  -43.09 
Europe Total  -36.71  2.14  -35.31  -73.58  -10.63  -75.83  -49.41  2.63  -48.12 
Pacific  AU  -27.78  -5.98  -32.10  -53.85  -26.57  -66.11  -15.91  4.48  -12.14 
   HK  -2.58  0.39  -2.20  -62.59  0.86  -62.27  -19.04  0.94  -18.28 
   JP  -37.36  13.10  -29.15  -66.61  20.24  -59.85  -67.07  27.38  -58.06 
Pacific Total  -22.57  2.50  -21.15  -61.02  -1.82  -62.75  -34.01  10.93  -29.49 
USA  US  -32.64  0.00  -32.64  -72.53  0.00  -72.53  -41.44  0.00  -41.44 
USA Total  -32.64  0.00  -32.64  -72.53  0.00  -72.53  -41.44  0.00  -41.44 
 
NOTES: LCU = rate of return in local-currency units; EXC = depreciation (-)/appreciation (+) of the US dollar relative to 
the  local  currency;  USD  =  rate  of  return  in  dollars;  AT=Austria;  BE=Belgium;  CH=Switzerland;  DE=Germany; 
DK=Denmark;  EI=Eire;  ES=Spain;  FR=France;  GR=Greece;  IT=Italy;  NO=Norway;  NL=Netherlands;  PT=Portugal; 
SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; HK=Hong-Kong; JP=Japan; US=United States. CME Group Inc., 
Discover Financial Services, Fukuoka Financial Group, and Invesco Ltd were excluded from the sample of 122 banks 
because they did not make the list at the end of July 2007. As CIT Group filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, it is 
excluded from November 2009.  
Source: Bloomberg (February 14, 2010). 32 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
Pre-Lehman failure period (31/07/2007-14/09/2008): 33,610 obs. 
     
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
Ri  -0.09%  3.04%  -58.67%  -1.71%  -0.11%  1.34%  40.85% 
Rm  -0.07%  1.51%  -8.65%  -0.95%  0.00%  0.76%  10.72% 
SIZEi   33,287   45,319   956   7,055   15,353   40,459   320,147  
SIZEm  4,235,453   444,594   2,610,880   3,901,534   4,246,899   4,594,350   5,132,827  
SIZEREL  0.79%  1.07%  0.02%  0.17%  0.37%  0.98%  8.38% 
               
Post-Lehman failure period (15/09/2008-31/12/2009): 38,760 obs. 
     
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
Ri  0.03%  5.36%  -75.15%  -2.20%  0.00%  2.03%  86.98% 
Rm  0.00%  2.46%  -13.03%  -1.11%  0.04%  1.15%  14.35% 
SIZEi  21,802  36,192  98  3,780  7,463  22,183   302,481  
SIZEm  2,791,859  738,404  1,314,889  2,188,021  2,694,310  3,551,743  3,950,598 
SIZEREL  0.78%  1.25%  0.00%  0.15%  0.28%  0.86%  9.83% 
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Table 3:  Effects of general and specific announcements on banks’ rates of return. 
  .                              All Announcements                                    .  .                                         Announcements by type                                     .  
AREA PERIOD 
VARIABLES 
WORLD PRE  WORLD POST  WORLD POST  WORLD POST  WORLD POST  WORLD POST  USA POST  EUROPE POST  PACIFIC POST 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Constant  -0.00342***  -0.00471***  -0.00470***  -0.00476***  -0.00472***  -0.00471***  -0.00516***  -0.00614***  -0.00366*** 
Rm  1.346***  1.409***  1.418***  1.418***  1.409***  1.422***  1.818***  1.283***  1.048*** 
SIZEREL  0.441***  0.581***  0.579***  0.588***  0.581***  0.581***  0.765***  1.195***  0.210*** 
G
ALL    0.00745***  0.00725***  0.00781***            
Rm*G
ALL      -0.0720***  -0.0714***            
SIZEREL*G
ALL        -0.0756            
G
CAP          0.00758***  0.00812***  0.0112***  0.00220  0.00655*** 
Rm*G
CAP            0.262***  0.421***  -0.103**  0.0138 
G
GUA          0.00288*  0.000994  0.00425  -0.00330#  0.00634*** 
Rm*G
GUA            -0.552***  -1.128***  -0.140***  -0.0312 
S
ALL  0.0177*  -0.00347**  -0.00351**  -0.00293            
Rm*S
ALL      0.123**  0.125**            
SIZEREL*S
ALL        -0.0642            
S
CAP          -0.00471**  -0.00491**  -0.00582*  -0.00384#  - 
Rm*S
CAP            0.136**  -0.398***  0.515***  - 
S
GUA          0.000896  0.00103  0.0138  -4.13e-05  - 
Rm*S
GUA            0.383***  1.725***  0.249**  - 
Observations  33,189  38,745  38,745  38,745  38,745  38,745  15,060  15,065  8,620 
R
2  0.447  0.420  0.420  0.420  0.420  0.424  0.435  0.433  0.562 
Number of bank  116  116  116  116  116  116  45  45  26 
WALD Test (Prob > F)  0.0831  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Hausman Test (Prob > chi2)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.0329  0.00250  0.0649 
SIZEREL (mean)  0.347%  0.456%  0.454%  0.461%  0.456%  0.456%  0.600%  0.937%  0.165% 
   Q1=Hypo Real Estate  0.068%  0.028%  0.028%  0.029%  0.028%  0.028%       
   Q2=Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  0.174%  0.262%  0.261%  0.265%  0.262%  0.262%       
   Q3=Bank of New York Mellon   0.488%  0.721%  0.719%  0.730%  0.721%  0.721%       
CAR=G
ALL*7    5.215%  5.075%  5.467%           
   CAR=G
CAP*7          5.306%  5.684%  7.840%  -  4.585% 
   CAR=G
GUA*7          2.016%  -  -  -2.310%  4.438% 
CAR=S
ALL*5  8.850%  -1.735%  -1.755%  -           
   CAR=S
CAP*5          -2.355%  -2.455%  -2.910%  -1.920%  - 
   CAR=S
GUA*5          -  -  -  -  - 
NOTES: PRE = 31/07/2007 to 14/09/2008; POST = 15/09/2008 to 31/12/2009. Rm = daily rate of return of the national stock exchange where bank i is located; SIZEREL = relative market capitalization; G (S) = 
general (specific) announcement dummy; ALL = all types; CAP = capital injections; GUA = asset and debt guarantees. Qx = Quartile x. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 7 (5) day windows for general 
(specific) announcements. All estimations include bank fixed effects; UK banks excluded. WALD vs null announcement effects; Hausman Test vs random effects. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15. 34 
 
Table 4: Cross-area effects of general announcements on banks’ rates of return, POST period. 
   .                           Base Model                           .  .                       Expanded Model                     . 
AREA  
VARIABLES 
USA   EUROPE   PACIFIC  USA   EUROPE  PACIFIC 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  -0.00498***  -0.00460***  -0.00392***  -0.00545***  -0.00461***  -0.00382*** 
Rm  1.752***  1.256***  1.049***  2.072***  1.378***  1.084*** 
SIZEREL  0.751***  1.035***  0.221***  0.762***  1.011***  0.210*** 
G
ALL  0.0130***  -0.000241  0.00551***  0.0115***  -0.000276  0.00549*** 
Rm*G
ALL        0.121**  -0.0793**  0.00425 
S
ALL  -0.00515*  -0.000702    -0.00525*  -0.000826   
Rm*S
ALL        -0.304***  0.368***   
XAGUSA    0.00773***  0.00174#    0.00699***  0.00153# 
Rm*XAGUSA          0.105**  0.0859** 
XAGEUROPE  0.000469  -0.00464***  -0.000879#  0.000990  -0.00466***  -0.000739 
Rm*XAGEUROPE        -0.378***  -0.181***  -0.0677*** 
XAGPACIFIC  -0.00280*  -0.00143#  0.00343***  -0.00177  -0.00153#  0.00355*** 
Rm*XAGPACIFIC        -0.472***  -0.201***  -0.0626# 
Observations  15,060  15,065  8,620  15,060  15,065  8,620 
R
2  0.423  0.433  0.563  0.431  0.438  0.563 
Number of bank  45  45  26  45  45  26 
WALD Test (Prob > F)  0.130  0  0.000200  0  0  0 
Hausman Test (Prob > chi2)  0.00620  0.00540  0.0873  0.0441  0.0513  0.429 
CAR=XAGUSA*7    5.411%  1.218%    4.893%  1.071% 
CAR=XAGEUROPE*7  -  -3.248%  -0.609%  -  -3.262%  - 
CAR=XAGPACIFIC*7  -1.960%  -1.001%  2.401%  -  -1.071%  2.485% 
NOTES: POST = 15/09/2008 to 31/12/2009. Rm = daily rate of return of the national stock exchange where bank i is located; SIZEREL = relative market 
capitalization  of  bank  i;  G  (S)  =  general  (specific)  announcement  dummy;  ALL  =  all  announcement  types  (capital  injections  and  asset  and  debt 
guarantees). XAGx = cross-area general announcement from multi-country x area: it excludes bank i’s home country announcements. CAR 
= cumulative abnormal returns with 7 day windows. All estimations include bank fixed effects; UK banks excluded. WALD vs null cross-area 




Table 5: Cross-bank effects of specific announcements on banks’ rates of return; POST period. 





ST Tertile  2
ND Tertile  3
RD Tertile  1
ST Tertile  2
ND Tertile  3
RD Tertile 
USA  USA  USA  USA  USA  USA 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
a 
Constant  -0.0107***  -0.0144***  -0.00852***  -0.0107***  -0.0144***  -0.00854*** 
Rm  1.702***  1.720***  1.821***  1.779***  1.790***  1.883*** 
SIZEREL  9.241***  4.941***  0.613***  9.313***  4.972***  0.613*** 
G
ALL  0.0142***  0.0132***  0.0101***  0.0137***  0.0128***  0.00973*** 
Rm* G
ALL        -0.293***  -0.244***  -0.200*** 
S
ALL  0.00521  0.00966  -0.00515  0.00310  0.00782  -0.00487 
Rm* S
ALL         -0.576**  -0.555***  -0.217** 
XAGEUROPE  -0.00313  0.000857  0.000280  -0.00331  0.000706  0.000293 
XAGPACIFIC  -0.00139  -0.00515**  -0.00386*  -0.00124  -0.00515**  -0.00381* 
XBS 1
ST Tertile  -0.00532**  -0.00658***  -0.00335*  -0.00517**  -0.00658***  -0.00332* 
XBS 2
ND Tertile  0.00119  0.00311  0.00304  0.000890  0.00303  0.00294 
XBS 3
RD Tertile  0.000947  0.000072  -0.00133**  0.000879  0.000025  -0.00130** 
Observations  5,010  5,025  5,025  5,010  5,025  5,025 
R
2  0.338  0.474  0.492  0.340  0.477  0.493 
Number of bank  15  15  15  15  15  15 
F-Test (Prob > F)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
WALD Test (Prob > chi2)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Hausman Test (Prob > chi2)  0.00700  0.000500  0.0944  0.0317  0.00200  0.138 
CAR=XGS 1
ST Tertile*5  -2.660%  -3.290%  -1.675%  -2.585%  -3.290%  -1.660% 
CAR=XGS 2
ND Tertile*5  -  -  -  -  -  - 
CAR=XGS 3
RD Tertile*5  -  -  -0.665%  -  -  -0.650% 
NOTES: POST = 15/09/2008 to 31/12/2009; Rm = daily rate of return of the national stock exchange where bank i is located; SIZEREL = relative market 
capitalization of bank i; G (S) = general (specific) announcement dummy; ALL = all announcement types (capital injections and asset and debt guarantees). 
XAGx = cross-area general announcement from x. XBS X
TH group = cross-group specific announcement from x
th group. XBS on itself 
excludes bank i’s announcements. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 5-day windows. All estimations include bank fixed effects; UK banks 
excluded. WALD vs null cross-group specific announcement effects; Hausman Test vs random effects. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15. 36 
 












(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Constant  0.000870  0.00102  -0.00138  0.00161  0.00135  -0.000502  0.00319 
Rm  2.251***  1.764***  2.187***  1.855***  1.501***  2.546***  1.665*** 
G
ALL  0.0185  0.00714  0.0107  0.00182  0.00641  0.0124  0.00318 
S
ALL  -0.0408**  0.00634  -0.00161  0.0313*  -0.0244  -0.0134  -0.00267 
XAGEUROPE  0.00277  0.00670  -0.00395  0.00327  0.00183  0.0137  -0.00306 
XAGPACIFIC  -0.00804  -0.000623  0.00732  0.00371  0.00749  0.00336  -0.00912 
XBSBANK OF AMERICA    -0.0141  -0.0418**  -0.0235*  -0.00986  -0.00924  -0.00736 
XBSJPMORGAN  0.00332    -0.00845  0.00905  -0.0141  -0.0121  0.0148 
XBSCITIGROUP  -0.00584  -0.0164    -0.0104  0.00612  -0.00342  0.000906 
XBSWELLS FARGO  0.0506**  0.0182  0.0588***    0.00959  0.0103  0.0111 
XBSGOLDMAN SACHS  -0.0326  -0.0189  -0.0542**  -0.0317*    -0.0265  -0.00510 
XBSMORGAN STANLEY  0.0126  0.00789  0.0423*  0.00332  -0.00703    -0.0118* 
XBSAMERICA EXPRESS  0.0229*  0.00667  0.0292  0.0134  -0.00149  0.0178*   
Observations  335  335  335  335  335  335  335 
R
2  0.518  0.585  0.420  0.502  0.570  0.576  0.661 
F Test (Prob > F)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
WALD Test (Prob > F)  0.0766  0.0888  0.0119  0.131  0.612  0.281  0.549 
CARBANK OF AMERICA=XBSBANK OF AMERICA*5    -  -20.90%  -11.75%  -  -  - 
CARJPMORGAN=XBSJPMORGAN*5  -    -  -  -  -  - 
CARCITIGROUP=XBSCITIGROUP*5  -  -    -  -  -  - 
CARWELLS FARGO=XBSWELLS FARGO*5  25.30%  -  29.40%    -  -  - 
CARGOLDMAN SACHS=XBSGOLDMAN SACHS*5  -  -  -27.10%  -15.85%    -  - 
CARMORGAN STANLEY=XBSMORGAN STANLEY*5  -  -  21.15%  -  -    -5.90% 
CARAMERICA EXPRESS=XBSAMERICA EXPRESS*5  11.45%  -  -  -  -  8.90%   
NOTES: POST = 15/09/2008 to 31/12/2009; Rm = daily rate of return of the national stock exchange where bank i is located; G (S) = general (specific) announcement dummy; ALL = all 
announcement types (capital injections and asset and debt guarantees). XAGx = cross-area general announcement from area x. XBSx = cross-bank specific announcement from 
x
th bank. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 5 day windows. All estimations with OLS and robust standard errors. WALD vs null cross-bank specific announcement 
effects. Banks ranked according to market capitalization on June 30, 2008. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 # p<0.15. 
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Table 7: Effects of cumulative specific announcements on banks’ rates of return by area, POST period. 
  .                            Model 1                          .  .                             Model 2                           . 
AREA  
VARIABLES 
WORLD   USA  EUROPE  WORLD  USA  EUROPE  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  -0.00444***  -0.000910*  -0.00638***  -0.00434***  -0.000986*  -0.00621*** 
Rm  1.279***  1.664***  1.162***  1.279***  1.664***  1.162*** 
SIZEREL  0.497***  0.253**  1.108***  0.487***  0.260**  1.076*** 
G
ALL  0.00788***  0.0129***  0.000773  0.00788***  0.0130***  0.000761 
Rm*G
ALL  -0.0358#  -0.241***  -0.100***  -0.0358#  -0.241***  -0.0998*** 
CUM1S≥1*Rm  0.572***  0.396***  0.431***  0.572***  0.347***  0.425*** 
CUM1S≥1*SIZEREL  0.0535  -0.204*  0.219*  0.0700  -0.148  0.184# 
CUM1S≥1*G
ALL  -0.00759***  -0.0107***  -0.0103**  -0.00495**  -0.0109***  0.0114* 
CUM1S≥1*Rm*G
ALL  0.491***  0.673***  0.219*  0.453***  0.554***  0.550*** 
CUM2S≥2*Rm        0.000204  0.234***  0.0130 
CUM2S≥2*SIZEREL        -0.0440  -0.0913  0.0801 
CUM2S≥2*G
ALL        -0.0110**  -0.00308  -0.0384*** 
CUM2S≥2* Rm*G
ALL        0.164  0.762***  -0.612*** 
Bank Effect  FE  RE  FE  FE  RE  FE 
Observations  38,745  15,060  15,065  38,745  15,060  15,065 
R
2  0.434  0.432  0.442  0.434  0.433  0.443 
Number of bank  116  45  45  116  45  45 
F-Test (Prob > F)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
WALD Test (Prob > chi2)  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Hausman Test (Prob > chi2)  0  0.123  0.000600  0.00120  0.402  0.0106 
CAR=CUMS≥1*G
ALL*7  -5.313%  -7.490%  -7.210%  -3.465%  -7.630%  7.980% 
CAR=CUMS≥2*G
ALL*7           -7.700%  -  -26.880% 
NOTES: POST = 15/09/2008 to 31/12/2009; Rm = daily rate of return of the national stock exchange where bank i is located; SIZEREL = relative 
market capitalization of bank i; G = general announcement dummy; ALL = all announcement types (capital injections and asset and debt guarantees). 
In Model 1, CUM1 = 1 when bank i has received at least 1 specific announcements, 0 otherwise. In Model 2, CUM1 = 1 when bank 
i has received only 1 specific announcements, 0 otherwise; CUM2 = 1 when bank i has received at least 2 specific announcements; 
0 otherwise. CAR = cumulative abnormal returns with 5 day windows. All estimations include bank specific effects but fixed or random effects 
are reported according to the Hausman Test; UK  banks excluded. WALD vs null cumulative specific announcement effects. No 





Table A1: List of banks included in market capitalization  
Area  Country Bank Nr.  Bank Name 
Europe 
AT  2  ERSTE GROUP BANK AG, RAIFFEISEN INTL BANK HOLDING 
BE  2  DEXIA SA, KBC GROEP NV 
CH  1  VALIANT HOLDING AG-REG 
DE  3  COMMERZBANK AG, DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG, HYPO REAL ESTATE HOLDING 
DK  3  DANSKE BANK A/S, JYSKE BANK-REG, SYDBANK A/S 
ES  6  BANCO  BILBAO  VIZCAYA  ARGENTA,  BANCO  DE  VALENCIA  SA,  BANCO 
POPULAR ESPANOL, BANCO SANTANDER SA, BANKINTER SA 
FR  4  BNP PARIBAS, CREDIT AGRICOLE SA, NATIXIS, SOCIETE GENERALE 
GR  5  ALPHA BANK A.E., BANK OF GREECE, EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS, NATIONAL 
BANK OF GREECE, PIRAEUS BANK S.A.  
IE  1  ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC 
IT  8 
BANCA CARIGE SPA, BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI SIENA, BANCA POPOLARE DI 
MILANO,  BANCO  POPOLARE  SCARL,  INTESA  SANPAOLO,  PICCOLO  CREDITO 
VALTELLINESE, UBI BANCA SCPA, UNICREDIT SPA 
NL  2  ING GROEP, SNS REAAL 
NO  1  DNB NOR ASA 
PT  3  BANCO BPI SA, BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES, BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO 
SE  4  NORDEA BANK AB, SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA, SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN 
SHS, SWEDBANK AB 
UK  6  BANK OF IRELAND, BARCLAYS PLC, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, LLOYDS BANKING 
GROUP PLC, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 
Pacific 
AU  6 
AUST AND NZ BANKING GROUP, BANK OF QUEENSLAND LTD, BENDIGO AND 
ADELAIDE  BANK,  COMMONWEALTH  BANK  OF  AUSTRALIA,  NATIONAL 
AUSTRALIA BANK LTD, WESTPAC BANKING CORP 
HK  8 
BANK OF CHINA LTD, BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS CO, BANK OF EAST ASIA, 
BOC HONG KONG HOLDINGS LTD, CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK, HANG SENG 
BANK LTD, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, IND & COMM BANK OF CHINA 
JP  12 
BANK OF YOKOHAMA LTD, CHIBA BANK LTD, CHUO MITSUI TRUST HOLDINGS, 
FUKUOKA  FINANCIAL  GROUP  INC.,  MITSUBISHI  UFJ  FINANCIAL  GROUP, 
MIZUHO  FINANCIAL  GROUP  INC,  MIZUHO  TRUST  &  BANKING  CO,  RESONA 
HOLDINGS INC, SHINSEI BANK LTD, SHIZUOKA BANK LTD, SUMITOMO MITSUI 
FINANCIAL GROUP, SUMITOMO TRUST & BANKING CO 
USA  US  45 
AMERICAN  CAPITAL  LTD,  AMERICAN  EXPRESS  CO,  AMERIPRISE  FINANCIAL 
INC,  BANK  OF  AMERICA  CORP,  BANK  OF  NEW  YORK  MELLON  CORP,  BB&T 
CORP, CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP, CIT GROUP INC, CITIGROUP INC, CMA 
GROUP  INC,  COMERICA  INC,  DISCOVERY  FINANCIAL  SERVICES,  E*TRADE 
FINANCIAL CORP, FEDERATED INVESTORS INC, FIFTH THIRD BANCORP, FIRST 
HORIZON  NATIONAL  CORP,  FRANKLIN  RESOURCES  INC,  GOLDMAN  SACHS 
GROUP  INC,  HUDSON  CITY  BANCORP  INC,  HUNTINGTON  BANCSHARES  INC, 
INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE  INC,  INVESCO  LTD,  JANUS  CAPITAL  GROUP 
INC,  JPMORGAN  CHASE  &  CO,  KEYCORP,  LEGG  MASON  INC,  LEUCADIA 
NATIONAL CORP, M & T BANK CORP, MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP, MOODY'S 
CORP,  MORGAN  STANLEY,  NASDAQ  OMX  GROUP,  NORTHERN  TRUST  CORP, 
NYSE  EURONEXT,  PEOPLE'S  UNITED  FINANCIAL,  PNC  FINANCIAL  SERVICES 
GROUP,  REGIONS  FINANCIAL  CORP,  SCHWAB  (CHARLES)  CORP,  SLM  CORP, 
STATE STREET CORP, SUNTRUST BANKS INC, T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC, US 
BANCORP, WELLS FARGO & CO, ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
NOTES:  AT=Austria;  BE=Belgium;  CH=Switzerland;  DE=Germany;  DK=Denmark;  EI=Eire;  ES=Spain;  FR=France; 
GR=Greece; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; NL=Netherlands; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; 




Table A2: Timeline of general announcements (USD millions) 
Data  Country 
Measure 
Total  Cumulative 
Capital Injections  Asset and Debt 
Guarantees 
28/09/2008  NL  29,192     29,192  29,192 
30/09/2008  EI  14,785  563,240  578,025  607,217 
02/10/2008  GR  6,927     6,927  614,144 
03/10/2008  US  700,000     700,000  1,314,144 
05/10/2008  DK  -     -  1,314,144 
07/10/2008  ES  68,245  136,490  204,735  1,518,879 
08/10/2008  IT  -     -   
   UK  952,050  432,750  1,384,800  2,903,679 
09/10/2008  IT     1,362  1,362   
   NL  27,292    27,292  2,932,333 
10/10/2008  ES  40,413  134,710  175,123  3,107,456 
12/10/2008  AT  18,669  93,345  112,014   
   AU    5,225  5,225   
   PT    26,942  26,942  3,251,637 
13/10/2008  DE  107,768  538,840  646,608   
   US  250,000    250,000  4,148,245 
14/10/2008  HK  -     -   
   NL    273,160  273,160   
   US    2,250,000  2,250,000  6,671,405 
16/10/2008  BE     -  -   
   CH  60,000    60,000   
   FR  53,664  429,312  482,976  7,214,381 
23/10/2008  GR     29,619  29,619  7,244,000 
24/10/2008  NO  1,459  51,071  52,530  7,296,530 
29/10/2008  SE     195,277  195,277  7,491,807 
05/11/2008  CH     -  -  7,491,807 
24/11/2008  PT  5,156     5,156  7,496,963 
28/11/2008  IT  -     -  7,496,963 
08/12/2008  FR  27,825     27,825  7,524,789 
10/12/2008  BE     -  -  7,524,789 
17/12/2008  JP  136,612     136,612  7,661,401 
18/01/2009  DK  17,770     17,770  7,679,171 
19/01/2009  UK     73,685  73,685  7,752,856 
03/02/2009  JP  11,225     11,225  7,764,080 
10/02/2009  SE  7,928     7,928   
   US  100,000    100,000  7,872,008 
12/02/2009  EI  8,975     8,975  7,880,984 
25/02/2009  IT  15,277     15,277  7,896,261 
06/03/2009  DE  -     -  7,896,261 
17/03/2009  JP  10,116     10,116  7,906,377 
23/03/2009  US  500,000     500,000  8,406,377 
13/05/2009  DE     272,240  272,240  8,678,617 
22/07/2009  HK     -  -  8,678,617 
Total  3,171,349  5,507,268  8,678,617    
NOTES: - = unspecified amount; AT=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EI=Eire; ES=Spain; 
FR=France; GR=Greece; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; NL=Netherlands; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; 
HK=Hong-Kong; JP=Japan; US=United States. 
SOURCES: Mediobanca, BIS-BdI, DLA Piper, International Capital Market Association, and websites of national Ministries of 
Treasury or Finance. 40 
 
 
Table A3: Timeline of specific announcements (USD millions) 
Data  Country  Bank 
Measure 
Total  Cumulative  Capital 
Injections 
Asset and Debt 
Guarantees 
14/03/2008  US  JP Morgan Chase & Co     29,000  29,000  29,000 
30/09/2008  BE  Dexia  4,224     4,224   
   FR  Dexia  4,224     4,224   
   LU  Dexia  529     529  37,978 
06/10/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate     67,540  67,540  105,518 
09/10/2008  BE  Dexia     123,837  123,837   
   FR  Dexia     74,712  74,712   
   LU  Dexia     6,141  6,141  310,208 
13/10/2008  UK  Lloyds TSB  28,963     28,963   
     RBS  34,074    34,074  373,245 
19/10/2008  NL  ING Groep  13,462     13,462  386,707 
22/10/2008  SE  Swedbank AB     0  0  386,707 
27/10/2008  BE  KBC  4,356     4,356  391,063 
28/10/2008  US  Bank of America  15,000     15,000   
     Bank of New York Mellon  3,000    3,000   
     Citigroup  25,000    25,000   
     Goldman Sachs Group  10,000    10,000   
     JP Morgan Chase & Co  25,000    25,000   
     Morgan Stanley  10,000    10,000   
     State Street Corp  2,000    2,000   
     Wells Fargo Bank  25,000    25,000  506,063 
30/10/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate     19,275  19,275  525,338 
03/11/2008  DE  Commerzbank  6,321  19,079  25,400  550,738 
07/11/2008  US  Franklin Resources  1,600     1,600  552,338 
12/11/2008  NL  SNS Reaal  942     942  553,280 
13/11/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate     25,052  25,052  578,332 
17/11/2008  US  BB&T Corp  3,134     3,134   
     Capital One Financial Corp  3,555    3,555   
     Comerica  2,250    2,250   
     First Horizon National Corp  867    867   
     Huntington Bancshares  1,398    1,398   
     Key Corp  2,500    2,500   
     Northern Trust Corp  1,576    1,576   
     Regions Financial Corp  3,500    3,500   
     Sun Trust Banks  3,500    3,500   
     US Bancorp  6,599    6,599   
     Zions Bancorporation  1,400    1,400  608,610 
21/11/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate     25,062  25,062  633,672 
23/11/2008  US  Citigroup  20,000  262,000  282,000  915,672 
25/11/2008  PT  Banco Espirito Santo     1,955  1,955  917,627 
09/12/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate     12,937  12,937  930,564 
11/12/2008  FR  BNP Paribas  3,390     3,390   
     Crédit Agricole  3,988    3,988   
     Societé Générale  2,260    2,260  940,202 41 
 
21/12/2008  EI  Allied Irish Banks  2,775     2,775   
     Bank of Ireland Group  2,775    2,775  945,752 
23/12/2008  US  M&T Bank Corp  600     600  946,352 
31/12/2008  DE  Commerzbank  13,919     13,919   
   US  CIT Group  2,330     2,330   
     Citigroup  20,000    20,000   
     Fifth Third Bancorp  3,408    3,408   
     PNC Financial Services Group  7,579    7,579   
     Sun Trust Banks  1,350    1,350  994,938 
08/01/2009  DE  Commerzbank     6,857  6,857  1,001,795 
09/01/2009  US  American Express Company  3,389     3,389   
     Bank of America  10,000    10,000  1,015,184 
12/01/2009  GR  Alpha Bank AE  1,268     1,268   
     EFG Eurobank Ergasias  1,268    1,268  1,017,720 
14/01/2009  AT  Erste Group Bank     7,904  7,904  1,025,624 
16/01/2009  US  Bank of America  20,000  97,000  117,000   
     Citigroup  7,000    7,000  1,149,624 
19/01/2009  NL  SNS Reaal     2,649  2,649  1,152,273 
20/01/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate     15,535  15,535  1,167,808 
22/01/2009  BE  KBC  2,591     2,591   
   GR  National Bank of Greece  453     453  1,170,853 
23/01/2009  GR  Pireus Bank  475     475  1,171,328 
26/01/2009  NL  ING Groep  28,346     28,346  1,199,674 
30/01/2009  NL  ING Groep     14,597  14,597  1,214,270 
05/02/2009  AT  Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG     1,926  1,926  1,216,196 
10/02/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate     12,966  12,966  1,229,162 
12/02/2009  EI  Allied Irish Banks  1,923     1,923   
     Bank of Ireland Group  1,923    1,923  1,233,009 
20/02/2009  NL  ING Groep     4,000  4,000  1,237,009 
26/02/2009  UK  RBS  18,645  466,115  484,760  1,721,768 
27/02/2009  AT  Erste Group Bank  3,419     3,419  1,725,187 
05/03/2009  NL  SNS Reaal     2,513  2,513  1,727,700 
07/03/2009  UK  Lloyds TSB  366,860     366,860  2,094,560 
10/03/2009  IT  Banco Popolare  1,849     1,849  2,096,409 
12/03/2009  NL  ING Groep     2,000  2,000  2,098,409 
13/03/2009  AT  Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG     1,611  1,611   
   BE  Dexia     15,082  15,082   
   US  Discover Financial Services  1,225     1,225   
     Morgan Stanley  1,225    1,225  2,117,552 
18/03/2009  IT  Unicredit Group  2,622     2,622  2,120,174 
20/03/2009  IT  Intesa Sanpaolo  5,426     5,426  2,125,600 
24/03/2009  IT  Banca Popolare di Milano  676     676  2,126,277 
27/03/2009  IT  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  2,528     2,528  2,128,805 
28/03/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate  79,703     79,703  2,208,508 
31/03/2009  FR  BNP Paribas  6,763     6,763  2,215,271 
04/04/2009  US  Bank of America  799     799  2,216,070 
13/04/2009  US  Citigroup  2,071     2,071   
     JP Morgan Chase & Co  2,700    2,700   
     Wells Fargo Bank  2,873    2,873  2,223,713 42 
 
15/04/2009  NL  SNS Reaal     369  369  2,224,082 
17/04/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate  162     162  2,224,244 
21/04/2009  NL  SNS Reaal     908  908  2,225,153 
22/04/2009  NL  SNS Reaal     729  729  2,225,881 
04/05/2009  AT  Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG     2,005  2,005  2,227,886 
07/05/2009  DE  Commerzbank  10,997     10,997  2,238,883 
13/05/2009  BE  KBC  2,042     2,042  2,240,925 
14/05/2009  BE  KBC     27,216  27,216  2,268,141 
22/05/2009  US  Franklin Resources  5     5  2,268,146 
28/05/2009  FR  Societé Générale  2,371     2,371  2,270,517 
02/06/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate  4,224     4,224  2,274,741 
12/06/2009  US  Citigroup  1,010     1,010  2,275,751 
16/06/2009  US  Bank of America  6     6  2,275,757 
19/06/2009  IT  Banco Popolare  0     0  2,275,757 
08/07/2009  US  State Street Corp  60     60  2,275,817 
15/07/2009  US  US Bancorp  139     139  2,275,956 
17/07/2009  US  PNC Financial Services Group  54     54  2,276,010 
22/07/2009  US  BB&T Corp  67     67   
     Goldman Sachs Group  1,100    1,100  2,277,177 
29/07/2009  US  American Express Company  340     340  2,277,517 
05/08/2009  US  Bank of New York Mellon  136     136  2,277,653 
12/08/2009  US  Morgan Stanley  950     950  2,278,603 
26/08/2009  US  Northern Trust Corp  87     87  2,278,690 
21/09/2009  IT  Banca Popolare di Milano  0     0  2,278,690 
30/09/2009  US  Bank of America  163     163   
     Invesco Legacy Securities Master Fund  3,330    3,330   
     Wells Fargo Bank  65    65  2,282,248 
05/10/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate  232     232  2,282,480 
03/11/2009  UK  Lloyds TSB  12,287     12,287   
     RBS  9,830    9,830  2,304,597 
04/11/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate  4,451     4,451  2,309,048 
03/12/2009  US  Capital One Financial Corp  149     149  2,309,196 
10/12/2009  US  JP Morgan Chase & Co  950     950  2,310,147 
14/12/2009  IT  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  0     0  2,310,147 
21/12/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate     61,572  61,572  2,371,718 
30/12/2009  IT  Piccolo Credito Valtellinese  286     286   
   US  Bank of America  666     666   
     PNC Financial Services Group  19    19   
     Wells Fargo Bank  1,213    1,213  2,373,903 
11/01/2010  EI  Bank of Ireland Group     18,751  18,751  2,392,654 
13/01/2010  EI  Bank of Ireland Group     5,797  5,797  2,398,451 
21/01/2010  EI  Allied Irish Banks     17,068  17,068  2,415,519 
Total        963,760  1,451,760  2,415,519    
NOTES:  We  exclude  expenses  for  failures  because  we  have  data  only  for  US;  AT=Austria;  BE=Belgium;  CH=Switzerland; 
DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; EI=Eire; ES=Spain; FR=France; GR=Greece; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; NL=Netherlands; PT=Portugal; 
SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; HK=Hong-Kong; JP=Japan; US=United States.  
SOURCES: Mediobanca, BIS-BdI, and CNN Money. 
 